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Copyright is becoming increasingly important as a mechanism to protect intellectual property. For example, US employment in copyright-intensive industries such as computer systems design, books, and video increased by 46 percent between 1990 and 2011, and by 2012, copyright-intensive industries accounted for a larger share of employment than patent-intensive industries (US Department of Commerce 2012, pp. 39-40) . The optimal length of copyright is the subject of intense debates within and across countries. In the United States and Europe, copyright provides temporary monopoly rights for 70 years after the author's death, and for 95 years to corporate owners. In China, copyrights create nominal exclusivity for 50 years after the initial publication, but enforcement is weak so that the expected length of copyright is relatively short.
Extensions in the length of copyright are intended to increase the profitability of creative work, albeit at the cost of limiting access and diffusion. Intuitively, an increase in the price of copyrighted content is the fundamental mechanism by which an extension in the length of copyrights may increase profits and limit diffusion. To formalize this intuition, we present a straightforward extension of existing models of intertemporal price discrimination to the case of a temporary monopoly, as provided by copyrights. This model predicts an increase in price in response to longer copyrights.
Intuitively, extensions in copyright length from T to T+c may increase price by preventing competitors from entering with cheaper copies for an additional number of years c. Endowed with a longer period of monopoly rights, copyright owners can better exercise intertemporal price discrimination by serving buyers with a high willingness to pay first, and delaying sales to buyers with lower willingness to pay until later periods.
Systematic empirical evidence on the causal effects of copyright terms, however, continues to be scarce. The most direct evidence comes from analyses of piracy, which 1 US companies may have lost more than $15 billion in 2009 due to copyright theft, including 3.5 billion due to software infringement in China (Reuters, January 10, 2012) . In 2013, a Chinese court ordered Apple to pay a total of $118,000 to bestselling author Mai Jia and two other authors for failing to secure permission to sell their books in Apple's App Store (Bostic 2013). have found a limited effect of file sharing on record sales (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 2007) , and on the supply of recorded music (Walfogel 2011).
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A major empirical challenge arises from the extreme length of modern copyrights, which implies that extensions may affect none but the most long-lived intellectual assets. This issue results in selection bias because information goods that are for sale nearly 100 years after their creation -when modern copyrights expire -are likely to be exceptionally durable. For example, Landes and Posner (2003, p. 212) report that only 174 of the 10,027 books published in 1930 (less than 2 percent) were still in print in 2001. 3 It therefore becomes difficult to identify price effects in modern data, even though copyrights have been shown to influence the availability of new editions of existing works. Heald (2008 Heald ( , p. 1040 Lobbying, however, makes it difficult to attach a causal interpretation to changes in price that follow modern copyright extensions.
To address these empirical challenges, this paper exploits an unanticipated and unintended differential increase in the length of copyrights, which increased copyrights starting from low pre-existing levels. This differential increase occurred with the UK Copyright Act of 1814, which was primarily intended to clarify a requirement to deposit copyrighted books with research libraries, but also changed the length of copyrights.
Until 1814, the length of copyright was 14 years (starting from the first edition) for books whose authors had died within 14 years since the first edition, and 28 years for books whose authors had survived the first 14 years. After 1814, copyright length increased from 14 to 28 years for books whose authors had died within 14 years since the first edition, and from 28 years to authors remaining years of life for books whose authors had survived the 14-year term. We show that, given historical life expectancies, this change created no substantial increase for books by living authors, compared with a 14-year extension for books by dead authors. 6 Our empirical approach takes advantage of this differential increase in copyright length to compare changes in price after 1814 for books by dead authors (which experienced an extension of 14 years) with changes in price after 1814 for books by living authors (which experienced only a small extension). This difference-indifferences approach allows us to control for unobservable factors that may have changed the price of all books after 1814, irrespective of changes in copyright. For 5 The 1998 Act extended copyright from 50 to 70 years after the death of an author and from 75 to 95 years for corporate owners. 6 Section II.D presents life tables, which calculate life expectancies for Romantic period authors in 1814, conditional on the author having reached 42, the age of the average author at the time of the first edition.
example, books may have become more expensive after 1814 because the demand for reading increased with advances in literacy. Book prices may also have declined with reductions in production costs as a result of the diffusion of continuous papermaking and steam-powered printing. 7 An additional benefit of our approach is that death is easily observable, whereas other proxies for the remaining length of copyright are subject to measurement error.
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A newly collected data set of book prices for 1,072 editions published between 1790 and 1840 allows us to examine the effects of copyright on price. editions in our data. We also control for unobservable characteristics that may vary across genres, and classify all books into novels, poetry, other fiction, and non-fiction.
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To proxy for literary quality we use Harold Bloom's (1994) Western Canon. To control for physical characteristics, which may influence production costs and consumers' willingness to pay, we collect additional data on page counts and dimensions.
In contrast to previous analyses, difference-in-differences estimates indicate a large and robust increase in price in response to stronger copyrights. Controlling for the age of books and for variation across authors, the price of books by dead authors increased by an additional 26.28 shillings after 1814 compared with books by living 7 The switch from producing individual sheets of paper to the continuous roll process (patented in 1799) substantially reduced the price of paper, which accounted for two thirds of production costs at the beginning of the 19 th century (Plant 1974, pp. 269-279 and 329-340) . 8 For example, publishers may have had private information about the health of authors, which is unobservable today, or they may have applied heuristic rules to estimate remaining years of life. By comparing price for books by dead and living authors, our analysis is robust to this type of error. 9 Non-fiction includes travel reports, historical analyses, and Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.
authors. Relative to an average price of 17.79 shillings after 1814, this implies a 147 percent increase in price, roughly 10 percent for each additional year of copyright, and an elasticity of price with respect to copyright length of 1.17. Results are robust to controlling for canonical books, for variation across genres, and to excluding author fixed effects. Time-varying estimates yield no evidence of differential pre-trends in the price of books by dead authors. Results are robust to excluding books by Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832) and Lord Byron (1788-1824), two extremely popular authors who had died after 1814. Results are also robust to excluding books by recently deceased authors, and to controlling for page numbers and physical dimensions.
The main threat to the identification strategy is that books by dead authors may have become more expensive after 1814 as a result of changes in tastes or other unobservable factors that differentially increased the price of books by dead authors.
To address this issue, we examine changes in the price of books by dead authors that did not benefit from longer copyrights. Specifically, we exploit the fact that the 1814 Act had no effect on the length of copyright for books by authors who had died between 14 and 28 years after the publication of the first edition (because these books had already been protected for 28 years under the 1710 Statute of Anne). Placebo regressions for these books yield no evidence of a differential increase in price.
To investigate the potential for intertemporal price discrimination, we examine historical records on the purchasing decisions of book buyers in the Romantic Period.
These records indicate a significant amount of variation in consumers' willingness to pay and show that at least a subset of buyers delayed their purchases to wait for cheaper editions. We also investigate whether publishers reduced the price of books as book titles approached the end of their copyright terms. This analysis exploits variation in authors' remaining years of life as a measure of the expected remaining length of copyright. With the caveat that this test is subject to more measurement error and selection bias than the main specifications, it confirms that publishers lowered the prices of books as they approached the end of copyright, even controlling for the age of books.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section I presents a straightforward extension of models of intertemporal price discrimination, which predicts a price increase in response to longer copyrights. Section II describes the changes in copyright, as well as the negotiations that led to the 1814 Act. Section II also presents life tables, which estimate remaining years of life for Romantic Period authors.
Section III describes the data. Section IV presents difference-in-differences analyses and robustness checks. Section V examines evidence for intertemporal price discrimination as a potential mechanism by which longer copyrights may increase price, and section VI concludes.
I. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
To formalize predictions about the effects of longer copyrights on price, we first present an extension of existing models of intertemporal price discrimination (e.g., Tirole 1988, p. 80; Scotchmer 2004, pp. 37-38) to the case of temporary monopoly rights. Suppose a publisher monopolist owns the exclusive rights to publish a book title i for T years, the duration of copyright. The publisher's marginal cost of producing an additional copy equals c, which includes the costs of paper, as well as the costs of printing another copy. The publisher is forward-looking and discounts future profits by a factor of !. In years t<T the publisher sells the book to a fixed pool of myopic buyers.
For tractability, we assume that consumers' willingness to pay is distributed ! ∼ uniform [0, 1] .
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10 This test may underestimate a decline in price in the final years of copyright because content that has been in print for 25 years or more may be particularly valuable and sell for a higher price. 11 The assumption of a uniform distribution of consumers' willingness to pay and the corresponding linear demand function allows us to illustrate the predictions of the model through a closed-form pricing scheme. The main prediction of the model (that price increases in the length of copyright) only depends on the existence of variation in consumers' willingness to pay, and holds for any downward-sloping demand function.
The key assumption of this model is that consumers differ in their willingness to pay. Historical evidence, which we present in more detail in Section V, supports this claim. Buyers of Romantic Period books ranged from wealthy individuals (St. Clair 2004, pp. 201, 245) Under these conditions, the publisher monopolist sets a separate price in each period a. Let ! !,! be the price that the publisher charges per copy of a new edition of the book at age ! when the length of copyright is !. The publisher monopolist chooses
where the residual demand curve at time
Under the original copyright length ! = 1, demand in period 1 equals
and the monopolist maximizes profits ! = (! − !) ⋅ !(!). Then, the profit-maximizing price is
If copyright is extended to ! = 2, the publisher chooses prices (! ! , ! ! ) in periods 1 and 2. In period 2, the monopolist publisher faces a residual demand of
. Given demand in period 2, the monopolist chooses a profit-maximizing price
For period 2, the profit-maximizing price is
and for period 1, the profitmaximizing price is
An extension to the case of forward-looking consumers with discount factors below 1 also predicts a price increase; this price increase is smaller than the price increase for myopic consumers.
Compared with modern settings, the case of Romantic Period book publishing shares many characteristics, and differs in two important aspects. First, technical advances in distribution have reduced the marginal cost of selling extra copies to nearly zero for many types of creative goods, including e-books and online movies. If ! = 0, the model above predicts a profit-maximizing first-period price ! !,! of
and a profit-maximizing second-period price of
Historical evidence also suggests that resale markets for books were relatively thin. For example, St. Clair (2004 p. 240) 12 A system of fines ensured enforcement. In 1801, a printer who had violated copyright lost all infringing copies of his book and paid a fine of 3d per sheet, "half to the crown, and half to whoever sued for it" (Seville 1999, p. 239) . Printers who imported infringing books were fined £10, roughly 20 times the average weekly wage of working-class men (Bautz 2007, p. 12) . Customs authorities searched travellers' luggage for illicit copies of copyrighted books (St. Clair 2004, pp. 200 and 299) . 13 Authors typically assigned both 14-year terms to the same publisher (St. Clair 2004, p. 161) . 14 Beckford v. Hood 1798 allowed publishers to sue for infringement damages on copyrighted works, even if they had not registered the book (Deazley 2008b Passed on July 29, 1814, the Copyright Act affirmed the requirement to deposit copies with the British Museum (now the British Library) and 10 university libraries within 12 months of publication ( § 2). As a concession to publishers, the Act relaxed the requirement to deposit copies on "best paper" and required only 1 such copy for the British Museum (Copyright Act 1814, § 3).
B. Extension to 28 Years or Life of Author
In addition to clarifying the deposit requirement, the 1814 Act also extended the length of copyright to "the Residue of [the author's] natural Life" ( § 4) for any book that was still under copyright in 1814. 17 This change resulted from an "opportunistic and timely intervention" on July 18 by a Member of Parliament, who was also an 15 In the 19 th -century, bookseller was a commonly used synonym for publisher because publishers had traditionally also sold books. Longman & Co. had abandoned their retail bookshop by 1810, but the Minutes of Evidence (1813) refer to Thomas Longman as a "bookseller." 16 In 1813, Thomas Longman reports that the costs of paper accounts for two-thirds of the costs of producing an edition with 500 copies (Minutes of Evidence 1813, p. 11). 17 In 1818, a unanimous decision in Brooke v. Clarke (1818) confirmed that copyrights that had already expired should not be revived by the Act (Deazley 2006, pp. 35-36). author, rather than a "principled or considered position adopted on the part of the legislature" (Deazley 2007, p. 839) .
18 Draft bills between May 18 and July 15 maintained existing terms of "twenty-eight years…and no longer" (Deazley 2007, p. 839) . A July 19 draft first specified an extension of copyright to "the residue of [the author's] natural life."
The Act also simplified the law to create a uniform 28-year term for books by dead authors ( § 8), regardless of whether the author had survived the first 14-year term.
This provision was added on July 26, 1814, "without any significant discussion" (Deazley 2007, p. 840 ).
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C. Publishers and Authors Oppose the Act until the 1820s
Publishers and authors continued to express their opposition to the Act until the 1820s, arguing "that the extended term was of little interest or value to them…[and that
the Bill] did little other than service the needs and interests of the university libraries" (Deazley 2007, p. 837) . For example, the publisher John Nichols wrote to author Rogers Ruding on March 12, 1818 that "Booksellers, Authors, and all persons interested, are making a strong push at present to endeavour to get redress from the onus of the Copyright Act." 20 In the same year, publisher Owen Rees argued that Longman had incurred production costs on the order of £3,000 to deliver library copies in the four years that had passed since the Copyright Act (Report from the Select Committee 1818, p. 3). Referring to the 14-year extension for books by dead authors, Rees testified:
"Rather than pay the 11 copies, would you surrender the 14 years copyright given by the Act? Rees: Yes, we would… The copyright of 14 years then, has been of no great avail to you?
Rees: No" (Report from the Select Committee 1818, p. 9).
Similarly, Thomas Longman responded to Member of Parliament Davies:
"Davies: As a principal bookseller, and a great purchaser of copy right, did you not consider an extension in the term of copy right, quite equivalent for the loss which they would sustain by the delivery of the eleven copies? Longman: I did not consider that" (Minutes of Evidence 1813, p. 11-12).
D. Differential Increase in Copyright for Books by Dead Authors
Why did publishers oppose the Act? Demographic data on 19 th -century life expectancies indicate that the extension to "life of author" implied at best a nominal extension in copyright length for the average author. Data on publication years (which we describe in more detail below) show that the average author was 42 years old in the publication year of the first edition, which marks the beginning of the copyright term. By comparison, the switch to a uniform 28-year term for dead authors increased copyright by 14 years for books by dead authors, which implies a differential increase in copyright of nearly 14 years (Appendix Table A1 ).
III. THE DATA
To empirically investigate the effects of copyright on price, we have collected a new data set on the prices of 1,072 new book editions that were published in Britain between 1790 and 1840. These data also include controls for book age, genre, literary quality, and physical characteristics.
A. Price Data for New Editions, 1790-1840
Price data are drawn from historical book catalogues and from St. Clair's (2004) historical account of The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period. These data cover a total of 1,072 book editions of 609 titles by 137 authors between 1790 and 1840. Price data indicate that books were extremely expensive.
Between 1790 and 1840, the average new edition sold for 17.71s (shillings), compared with a weekly wage of roughly 9 shillings for a working-class male (Bautz 2007, p. 12 ).
Books were sold in a temporary cover of plain paper boards, leaving buyers to add a 24 Anecdotal evidence suggests that booksellers acted aggressively to discourage retailers from selling books below their listed price. In 1829, the London Booksellers' Committee decreed to boycott retailers that had attempted to sell books below their list price (Barnes 1964, p. 1 
B. Controls for First Editions, Book Age, and Variation across Authors
To distinguish books that had been in print for 14 years or less, and were therefore affected by the differential change in copyright, and to control for variation in the life cycle of books, we calculate the age of each book in the year in which we observe the price of a new edition. We collect publication years of first editions from
Google Books, and calculate the age of a book by subtracting the year of the first edition from the publication of the edition for which we observe price. 26 We use these data to construct book age fixed effects, which allow us to control for first editions and for the number of years that have passed since the first edition of a book. In our data, 902 of 1,072 editions were new editions of book titles that had been in print for 14 years or less. On average, these 902 editions sold for a price of 17.72s.
To control for idiosyncratic differences in consumers' willingness to pay across Specifications with author fixed effects ( Table 2 , columns 1-3) exploit variation in price for 344 editions by 17 authors whose books were published before and after the author's death. Intuitively, difference-in-differences estimates with author fixed effects measure a differential increase after 1814 in the price of new editions by the same 34 Price data for 2 or more editions are available for 202 titles, which is insufficient to estimate difference-in-differences within titles. Price is observable while the author is dead and alive for 28 titles, including 3 with editions before and after the author's death until 1814, and 16 after 1814. 35 Calculated as the percent increase in price (26.28 relative to the pre-1814 average price of 17.70s for books by dead authors) relative to the percent increase in copyright (13.58 years relative to 13.58-2.89, where 2.89 is the pre-1814 mean age of books by dead authors). This elasticity is proportional to IV estimates from a regression of the change in price on the change in copyright term post-1814, using death as an instrument for changes in copyright. Baseline IV estimates imply an increase of 14.16s for each additional year of copyright (with a p-value of 0.05), only slightly larger than our baseline OLS. 
B. Time-varying Estimates of Differential Effects before and after 1814
To investigate the timing of effects, we estimate difference-in-differences coefficients separately for three-year intervals beginning in 1800: 38 The share of posthumous editions is small, with 5. where year r is an indicator variable to denote 3-year intervals r for 1800-1802,…,1836-1838; the interval 1812-1814 is the excluded time period. Coefficients β r measure differences in price for books by dead compared with living authors for three-year intervals r 1800-1802,…,1809-1811, 1815-1817,…1836-1838. Similar to the previous specification, φ a controls for age fixed effects, δ r controls for three-year fixed effects, and f s controls for author fixed effects. 
C. Excluding Books by Popular Authors Who Died after 1814
40 An 1833 edition of Byron's Letters and Journals sold for 45s, slightly more than half the original price.
In the main specification, book age fixed effects φ a control for changes in price across editions; robustness checks below control for variation in price for authors who had been dead for one year or less.
The most important potential threat to the empirical strategy is that the price of (Table 3 , column 2) , using the natural logarithm of price as dependent variable (Appendix Table A2 , Column 4) and to controls for canonical books (not reported).
Estimates are also robust to excluding books by Scott and Byron. Baseline estimates indicate that books by dead authors became an additional 20.44 shillings more expensive after 1814 (with a p-value of 0.00, Estimates are robust to controlling for genre (Table 3 , column 6), as well as to including controls for canonical books and to excluding author fixed effects (not reported).
E. Controlling for Page Numbers and Page Size
We also investigate whether the differential increase in price for books by dead authors may be due to variation in physical characteristics, such as page numbers and physical dimensions. For example, books with additional pages may be more valuable to readers and more costly to produce. If page counts increased more for books by dead authors, books by dead authors may have become more expensive after 1814
independently of changes in copyright.
Regressions with controls for page numbers indicate that the price of books by dead authors increased by 27.79s after 1814 compared with books by living authors (with a p-value of 0.00, Table 4 , column 1). 43 Results are robust to controlling for genre fixed effects and for canonical books, with estimates of 20.55s (with a p-value of 0.01, (with a p-value of 0.00, Table 4 , column 4) and 31.52 (with a p-value of 0.01, not reported), and to using log price as dependent variable (Appendix Table A2 , Column 6). 
F. Placebo: Editions by Dead Authors that did not Benefit from the Extension
To test whether changes in tastes or other unobservable factors may have caused the observed increase in price for books by dead authors, we estimate placebo regressions for editions by dead authors that did not benefit from longer copyrights.
Under the 1710 Statute of Anne, books whose authors had survived the first 14-year term remained under copyright for another 14 years, so that the total length of copyright was 28 years even before 1814. Placebo regressions test whether these editions by dead authors, which did not benefit from the 1814 extension but would have been affected by changes in tastes and other unobservable factors, experienced a differential increase in price after 1814.
With the caveat that placebo regressions are based on a substantially smaller sample than the main specifications, they yield no evidence of a differential price increase for books by dead authors. In a data set of 68 editions on copyright that had been in print for more than 14 years, the estimate for dead st * post1814 t is small at 3.30s
and not statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.85, Table 5 , column 1). Placebo regressions that include controls for genre and exclude author fixed effects similarly fail to produce significant estimates (with 9.05s and -7.60s, and p-values of 0.62 and 0.44, respectively, Table 5 , columns 2-3). 44 In a larger sample of 87 editions that includes books off copyright, the estimated increase is 0.86s (not statistically significant, not reported).
An additional placebo test moves the post period to begin in 1809, 5 years before the Copyright Act. Evidence from parliamentary records indicates that the differential increase in copyright length was unanticipated. If, however, it had been anticipated, or if the price of books by dead authors increased as a result of other factors that were in place before 1814, estimates for the interaction between dead st and post1809 it should be positive and statistically significant. Consistent with the historical evidence, however, the estimate for dead st * post1809 it is close to zero and insignificant:
1.869 (with a standard error of 6.911, Table 5 , column 4). to theaters for an exclusive window of several months, before making them available for home viewing. For movies, books, and other types of information goods, which are costly to produce but cheap to replicate (Shapiro and Varian 1999; Varian 2005) , the ability to pursue intertemporal price discrimination depends on the expected length of copyright.
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A stylized model of intertemporal price discrimination with temporary monopoly rights (in Section I) predicts that price will increase in response to longer copyright terms. Intuitively, an extension in the length of copyright can improve the ability of publishers to practice intertemporal price discrimination, in which a monopolist offers successive generations of a new good at lower prices "for the purpose of exploiting differences in consumers' reservation price" (Stokey 1979, p. 355) .
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45 Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 3) define "information goods" as anything that can be digitized, or converted into a stream of bits, including books, magazines, music, databases, and web pages. 46 More broadly, Coase (1972) conjectures that a monopolist who sells durable goods to forward-looking consumers sets price at marginal cost beginning with the first sale because consumers anticipate that the monopolist will reduce price over time and can delay their purchases. McAfee and Wiseman (2008) show that monopolists may be able to commit to limits on future price reductions by restricting
In this section we present historical evidence on the market for 19 th century books, which indicates significant differences in consumers' reservation price or willingness to pay for books. We also exploit variation in the remaining years of copyright for book titles in the year of a new edition to examine whether publishers reduced the price of new editions as books approached the end of copyright.
A. Variation in Willingness to Pay
Wealthy individuals and commercial lending libraries accounted for the majority of the market for Romantic Period books. For example, St. Clair (2004, p. 245) explains that roughly half of all first editions of Jane Austen's novels were sold to "members of the titled classes and gentry…the others probably going to circulating libraries." St. Clair (2004, p. 237) estimates that roughly 1,000 circulating libraries were operating in Britain in 1801, and 1,500 in 1821. According to Hamlyn (1946, p. 198) "not less than one thousand" circulating libraries operated in England by 1850. Library, for example, charged an annual fee of 2 guineas or 504 pence in 1804 to access a collection of roughly 20,000 volumes, while provincial circulating libraries rented production capacity, if increasing capacity incurs at least a small cost. Ericson and Pakes (1995) provide an empirical framework with forward-looking firms and forward-looking consumers; Doraszelski and Pakes (2007, p.1960) explain that empirical analyses with forward-looking firms and consumers are rare because the approach is "likely to increase the burden of computing equilibria significantly." 47 Until circulating libraries emerged, readers had purchased books to share in "reading societies" (St. Clair 2004 p. 246-247) . Private libraries were rare (Plant 1974, pp. 263-64) ; public libraries emerged after 1850 (Wiegand and Davis 1994, p. 608). books to readers for a penny per volume and often held less than 200 volumes (Jacobs 2006, pp. 5-6) . 
B. Changes in Price as Books Approach the End of Copyright
Variation in the price of new editions also indicates that publishers exploited differences in buyers' willingness to pay by selling to buyers with higher willingness to pay first, and covering the remainder of the market at declining prices -while books remained on copyright. For example, Thomas Moore's poem Lalla Rookh sold for 42s in 1817, for 14s until 1827, and for 5s after 1829 (Appendix Figure A2) . By 1855, four 48 In an essay on the circulating libraries, Charles Dickens (1894, p. 490) (St. Clair 2004, pp. 198 and 620) .
To systematically investigate such changes, we use data on authors' years of death to calculate their remaining years of life in year t and estimate variation in price as a function of remaining years of copyright:
where price it measures price and L it measures the remaining years of copyright for edition i in year t, which equals the difference between the final year of copyright T and calendar year t. 10.5s for editions on copyright, compared with 9.0s off copyright.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the effects of an extension in the length of copyrights on price, as the fundamental lever by which stronger copyrights may encourage investments in creative works and limit their diffusion. A simple extension of existing models of intertemporal price discrimination implies that an increase in the length of copyright will increase the price of creative works.
Our empirical analysis has exploited a differential increase in the length of copyright -in favor of books by dead authors -to identify the causal effect of longer copyright terms on price. Difference-in-differences regressions, which compare changes in the price of books by dead and living authors, reveal a substantial increase in price in response to longer copyrights. Results are robust to a broad range of alternative specifications (including controls for genres, canonical books, and physical characteristics), and to excluding author fixed effects. They are also robust to excluding books by popular authors who had died after 1814, and to excluding books by recently deceased authors. Estimates of time-varying effects yield no evidence of differential pre-trends. Placebo regressions for books by dead authors that did not benefit from the extension in 1814 indicate no differential price increase for books by dead authors.
Historical evidence supports the idea that an extension in copyright may increase price by improving publishers' ability to practice intertemporal price Empirical analyses of modern data indicate that -starting from copyright lengths of 75 years -further extensions in copyrights may reduce welfare by limiting access to copyrighted works (Heald 2008; Reimers 2013) . Even if the ability to practice intertemporal price discrimination mitigates the dead weight loss from copyright (Scotchmer 2004 , pp. 36-39, Mortimer 2007 , the welfare effects of these extensions are likely to be negative. For example, Akerlof et al. (2002) caution that the 1998 extension from 75 to 95 years should not be expected to strengthen the incentives to create new works, while it may discourage creative work that uses existing materials.
By comparison, our findings imply that extensions that start from low levels of pre-existing copyrights may improve welfare by increasing the profitability of creative work. This implication is corroborated by a rare historical data set on payments to the authors of 208 UK fiction titles between 1800 and 1830, which documents a significant increase in payments to authors in response to longer copyrights (MacGarvie and Moser 2013). The empirical setting of our study is most directly comparable to modern countries, such as China and India, where effective levels of copyright protection continue to be low. For these countries, our historical findings suggest that strengthening copyrights may encourage creativity and innovation. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent, level.
Note: Column (1) - (2) Note: Column (1) -(2) include controls for the number of pages in a book; data on page numbers are available for 692 book editions of 430 book titles by 107 authors between 1790 and 1840; column (3) -(4) include fixed effects for page size, which publishers define by the number of times a piece of paper is folded to create the pages of a book. Data on page sizes are available for 665 editions of 420 book titles by 106 authors. Book age fixed effects control for first editions and the number of years that have passed since the first edition of a book. Genre fixed effects control for variation in price across novels, poetry, other fiction, and non-fiction. Price data from the London Catalogue of Books (Brown et al. 1799; Hodgson 1851) Note: Columns 1-3: Price data for 68 new editions between 1790 and 1840 of 47 titles that are still on copyright (to maintain comparability with the main specifications), but have been in print for more than 14 years (and therefore were not affected by the differential increase in copyright that affects the main specifications). Columns 4: Price data for 902 editions of 548 titles on copyright that had been in print for 14 years or less, by 116 authors between 1790 and 1840. Book age fixed effects control for first editions and for the number of years that have passed since the first edition of a book. Price data from St. Clair (2004) , the London Catalogue of Books (1799 Books ( , 1851 where price it measures the price of title i in year t, L it measures the remaining years of copyright for edition i in year t, which equals the difference between the final year of copyright T for a title i and calendar year t. For book titles with first editions before 1814, T equals the year of the first edition plus 14 years if the author died within 14 years of the first edition, and plus 28 years if the author died between 14 and 28 years after the first edition. For book titles with first editions after 1814, T equals the maximum of year of first edition plus 28 years and the author's remaining life. The matrix X it includes controls for genres, book age fixed effects, five-year fixed effects, and books by dead authors. We estimate five-year, rather than one-or two-year fixed effects to increase statistical power. Price data include 970 editions of 563 book titles on copyright from St. Clair (2004) , the London Catalogue of Books (Brown et al. 1799; Hodgson 1851) , and the English Catalogue of Books (Peddie and Waddington 1914) . Book ages are calculated using data on first editions, which we collected from the records of the British Library and Google Books. Demographic data are collected from the Dictionary of Literary Biography (various volumes). *** denotes significance at the 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent, level.
